

3. Lin Pizo suggested the organization of an Independent Advance Army Unit for the winter offensive. This unit would be divided into three routes: East, West and Central. Each route would have a commander and two vice-commanders. It was 25X1A9a

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suggested that each route have two corps each with three regiments. Each corps would have a cavalry regiment. Note: Source does not clearly state whether the cavalry regiment is in addition to or is one of the original three).

4. The meeting decided to appoint Fu Ien Man Tu as Commander of the East floute Independent Alliance Army and Chou Pao-chung as Commander of the West Route. The Commander of the Central Route was not disclosed.

For paragraphs one through four inclusive:

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- 5. In contemplation of the winter offensive, a secret agreement has been concluded between Lin Piao and Pu Yen Man Tu, chairman of the Last Mongolian Autonomy Government. They agreed that two cavalry divisions were to be dispatched from 25X1X6 East Mongolia Mote: It is not known whether source means the eastern part of Outer Mongolia, or whether he refers to the area around Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05), headquarters of the Last Mongolian Autonomy Government). These divisions would have Mongolian officers and six to ten Chinese Communists as directing and liaison officers. Furthermore, one infantry unit, one destroying unit, one political unit, and one artillery battalion would be incorporated into one mixed corps, called the flight wing Advance Army. It would be organized as follows:
 - a. 6 cavalry regiments, with 3,000 men.
 - b. 3 infantry detachments, with 450 men.
 - c. 1 artillery battalion, with 370 men. It would have three companies.
 - d. 1 destroying unit, with about 500 men.
 - e. I political unit, with about 120 men.

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Note: The following contradictory information based on a secret interview with an official of the cast Mongolian Autonomy Government.)

The East Mongolian Autonomy Government was entirely instigated and encouraged by Soviet Russia. The Mongols are not particularly interested in the Communist cause, and if the Nationalists would put the chairman, Pu Yen Man Tu, into an important government post, the Mongols would follow him over to the Nationalist side.

Suggests that General Ma Chan-shan be appointed to negotiate with the Mongols, as he is very popular among Manchurians because of his resistance struggle against the Japenese. (Fu Yen Man Tu and other officials of the present East Mongolian Government used to be high officials of puppet Manchukuo).

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- 7. There are three major cliques among the Chinese Communists. They are as follows:
 - a. Soviet Clique
 - (1) Chou Feo-chung is the head. He was trined in Russia and came to Manchuria with the Soviet Army after the Japanese surrender. He commands the Wortheast Manchurian People's Self-Protection Army. This army is equipped with Soviet weapons, was established to overthrow the imperialist control of Japan, and is not sincerely Communist.

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Note: Chou was previously reported as Commanding Officer, Kirin-Liaoning Military Area).


- (2) Tseng Ke-lin, Chou's subordinate, is sometimes listed in the Soviet Clique, since Chou controls his troops; but he belongs to the Manchurian 8th floute Army Clique.
 (See below).
- (3) Yu Tien-tang, Marbin Garrison Commander, Note: Also received Yu Tien-feng. Yu Tien-fang? Reported in January to be Chief of Staff, 8th Military Sector at Nenchiang (125-13, 49-11).
- b. Yenan Clique
 - (1) Lin Piao
 - (2) Hsiao Hua
 - (3) Ma Chi
 - (4) Tsao Li-huai
 - (5) The forces of the following men are controlled by Iin Piao, but the men are considered, even by Yenan, to belong to the Manchurian 8th doute /rmy Clique:
 - (a) Lu Cheng-tsao
 - (b) Chang Hsuch-shih
 - (c) Jan Yi
- c. Manchurian 8th Route Army Clique
 - (1) Tseng Ke-lin is the head. As explained above, his troops are under the jurisdiction of Chou Pao-chung. These troops are the Northeast People's Autonomy Army, organized after the Japanese surrender. Most of the soldiers are puppet Manchukue troops and local bad elements. Their morale is low, and they do not believe in any particular doctrine.
 - (2) See b (5) above.

For Paragraph 7:

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CENTAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP



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8. If the Chinese Nationalist Government adopted effective political and tactical means of pacifying the Soviet Clique, disunity between them and the Yenan Clique could easily materialize. If MA Chan-shan were appointed to an important government post in Manchuria, the Yenan Clique would surrender. If these two cliques were effectively united, the dissolution of the third, the Manchurian 8 houte Army Clique, would be a certainty.

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LIN Piao called another secret meeting in Harbin Garrison Headquarters. The following were present:

a. Chinese Communists:

Lin Piao
Lu Cheng-tsao
Chou Pao-chung
Yu Tien-fing
Liu Cheng-tung, Layor of Harbin
Hsieh Yu-chin, Jino-Soviet Friendship depresentative
Commissioner Fong Chung-yun. (Previously reported as Chairman (Governor) of
Sungchiang Frovince)
Chairman Sung Chi-wen. (Area not stated)
Commander Wang Feng. (Unit not stated)

b. Representatives of the Mastern Mongoli n Autonomous Government:

Kuo Wen-lin, Military Affairs Minister High Advisor Na Ta Mu Teh 7 others

c. Koreans:

12 others.

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Mote: The names in the original report were given in Chinese romanization, and no characters were supplied.

Lin Chan-chung, North Korean Military Commissioner. Chang Tien-shun, Korean Northeast Army Commander. Chin Ping, North Korean Youth Training Institute Chief. 4 others.

d. Representatives of C.D.L., Soviet Secret Organization:

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Note: It is not known for what the initials stand.)

Sung Peng-yueh (Korean)
Chin Wen-chun whose address is #174 Yen San Li, Kon San Kun, South Chung
Cheng Prefecture, Central Korea.

- e. The following decisions were reached:
 - (1.) The offices of the North Korean administration will be at Yenchi (129-31, 42-55).
 - (2) The North Korean Military Headquarters will be established at Tungfossu (129-15, 42-53).
 - (3.) The North Korean Youth Training Institute will be established at Lungchingtsun (129-26, 42-45).



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- (4.) Korean youths in Yenchi, Muling (133-38, 45-59) [? Holung, 129-33, 42-38] Huichu [? Hunchun, 130-22, 42-52] and Nantu [Antu, 128-22, 42-31] districts will be controlled by the North Korean Commissioner.
- (5.) The Youths' Self-Protection Army, now stationed at Yenchi, Lungchingtsun, and Talatzu /Holung/ will be moved to Tatuchuan /Tungfeng/(125-31, 42-41 Chingyang (? Chingyuan, 124-55, 42-04), and Miaoling (124-55, 42-12) before 1 October.
- (6.) One cavalry division of the East Mongolian troops will be sent to Angangchi (125-48, 47-09).

25X1A6a Rote: The correct coordinates for Angangchi should read 123-48, 47-09. Possibly Anchangchen, 125-15, 42-59, is meant, see paragraph 4, page 2.

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